Stallard v. Goldman Sachs & Voodoo: What Survived, What Didn’t—and Why It Matters for App Developers

The Eastern District of Virginia’s opinion in Stallard v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. & Voodoo SAS is a compact roadmap for anyone litigating over app store takedowns and look-alike mobile games. The plaintiff, an indie developer proceeding pro se, claimed that Voodoo’s “Knock Balls” copied his “Knocky Balls,” and he attempted to rope in Goldman Sachs as a deep-pocket investor. Judge Patricia Tolliver Giles split the baby: trademark and unfair-competition theories survive against Voodoo, as does a Virginia tortious-interference claim pegged to a Google Play removal; everything else—including all claims against Goldman Sachs and all copyright theories—was dismissed. The court also denied the plaintiff’s sanctions bid.

Two pleading choices stood out. First, the developer had registered “Knocky Balls” with the USPTO and alleged use in U.S. commerce dating back to 2016. That mattered. At the Rule 12 stage, registered marks are presumed valid and likelihood-of-confusion is rarely resolved on the pleadings. The court therefore allowed the Lanham Act and parallel Virginia unfair-competition claims to move forward against Voodoo for the name and logo, reserving the confusion analysis for a more developed record.

Second, the tortious-interference count was framed around a concrete platform relationship: distribution of the game through Google Play. The complaint alleged that Voodoo knew about that relationship, asked Google to remove the game for “impersonation,” and that Google in fact removed it—causing economic harm and complicating reinstatement. Taken as true and construed liberally, those allegations checked the Virginia elements, so the motion to dismiss was denied on that claim as to Voodoo.

Everything else fell away. Copyright claims did not clear the line between unprotectable ideas and protectable expression; high-level similarities in concept and “feel” were not enough, and the court did not find plausible allegations of substantial similarity in original audiovisual or code elements. The judge also emphasized that Stallard did not provide the source code of either game, which weakened his claim of direct evidence of copying. With direct infringement out, secondary copyright theories against Goldman Sachs went nowhere. Nor did secondary trademark theories against Goldman: mere investor status, without facts showing inducement, control, or a partnership relationship, does not state contributory or vicarious liability. Fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy claims were also dismissed for the usual reasons—lack of particularity, no benefit conferred, and no plausible agreement. And while the plaintiff pressed for sanctions over a filing misstep, the court found no basis for Rule 11 or inherent-power sanctions.

For developers and counsel, the opinion underscores several practical lessons. Registering a game’s name and logo can be decisive at the first procedural gate. If a rival’s report triggers an app store takedown, a carefully pleaded tortious-interference theory tied to a specific distribution relationship and concrete harm can survive. But copyright claims require more than a shared mechanic or vibe; plead particular original elements and how they are substantially similar. Finally, claims against investors should be grounded in specific facts about inducement or control—capital alone won’t do.